



MULTINATIONAL FORCE STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES (MNF SOP)



Extract from MNF SOP Noncombatant Evacuation (NEO) Operations

**Version: 2.6
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ANNEX A

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION (NEO) (MILITARY ASSISTED EVACUATION)

1. **Purpose.** This annex addresses Military Assisted Evacuation Operations, normally referred to as NEO.

NOTE: The term “NEO” means noncombatant evacuation but refers to **Military Assisted Evacuation Operations**. Most of the time the Foreign Affairs / State Department of a nation **normally** executes evacuation operations without any military assistance – but when called upon, it is almost always within a crisis response – time sensitive situation. The fact that NEO planning is ongoing is very sensitive and can have unintended perceptions by the public and media at large. As will be pointed out in this Annex, the order to evacuate **is always a political decision with extensive ramifications**. NEO execution (and crisis action NEO planning) signifies the situation has deteriorated to the point that nations have lost faith in the host nation’s ability to maintain control of the situation or a clear danger to the evacuees exists.

2. **Overview.** PO Challenges and Operational Realities.

2.1. NEOs are conducted as **an option of last resort** to assist the Foreign Affairs and State Departments in evacuating noncombatants, nonessential military personnel, selected host nation citizens, and third party nationals, whose lives are in danger, to a designated temporary / final safe haven. During NEOs, the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is the senior authority for the overall evacuation for most nations.

2.2. The requirement for NEO may exist due to an unfavorable political environment, conflict, or natural disaster in the host nation. Although the procedures for C2 and NEO planning described in this annex are directed primarily towards politically uncertain situations and conflict scenarios, they are also applicable to man-made or natural disasters where evacuation operations are required.

2.3. It must be recognized in NEO planning and execution that perceptions within the host nation vis-à-vis the TF NEO’s impartiality and/or neutrality to various factions including government forces can have a detrimental effect on the NEO effort. Due vigilance must be exercised by the CTF/JTF and all elements of the supporting Information Operations plan (including public affairs) should be coordinated and executed with this in mind.

2.4. In a multinational setting, the ability to share information can be problematic. This is especially pertinent in a NEO context where speed of response is critical. Therefore, mechanisms to facilitate information exchange between all participating nations must be identified early in the planning process. Agreement to share information must be coordinated at the strategic or national command level and include both Foreign Affairs/State Department and military planning personnel. Where nations are unwilling or unable to share information, this should also be identified to alleviate potential misunderstandings.

2.5. This annex addresses 4 Key Operational Decisions required for NEO planning and coordination. These decisions support timely initial response and overall mission effectiveness for a NEO Task Force (NEO TF). Further, these decisions ensure joint and multinational planners have firm starting points and frames of reference to support unity of effort within the NEO TF.

3. **NEO Command and Control.** [Refer to Part B, Chapter 2: Command – Control – Coordination](#) and Cooperation. It is important to recognize that NEO will normally **not** be executed within a Coalition / Combined Task Force (CTF) (multinational command structure) due to the extreme time sensitive aspects of most NEO missions.

3.1. However, it must be recognized that major NEO operations **are multinational in nature**. In such situations a Lead Nation for “coordination” may be identified for cooperation and coordination among nations using the MNCC concepts ([refer to Part B, Chapter 2: Multinational Coordination Center](#)).

3.2. Figure D-1-A.1 outlines a parallel JTF command relationship approach for NEO. This concept recognizes **both the multinational nature of major NEO operations and the separate JTF operational reality for such operations.** The MNCC concept ensures that coordination and cooperation is established for all NEO operations. Further, a MNCC can be established rapidly in a crisis situation.




Figure D-1-A.1: Multinational Coordination Center (Separate NEO JTFs)

4. **Annex Focus:** This chapter focuses on the operational level of planning and coordination, as is the case for all chapters in this MNF SOP; however, the strategic and tactical levels are briefly addressed in this chapter where these levels have a significant impact on NEO TF operational planning and mission execution.
5. **Terminology NEO Comment:** Nations have many different terminologies for the various functions within the NEO sequence of actions. For example, Forward Mounting Base (FMB) or Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) are clearly different terms, however the functions performed at these sites are similar. This SOP attempts to achieve a common terminology that is functional in nature and can be easily translated into each nation's language and operational concepts. Duplicate terminology is used at times to allow for flexibility where functions are fully aligned but are named differently within various nations.
6. **Drawdown and Evacuation Actions.** Outlined below are the steps leading to and including evacuation of a nation's citizens from a host nation. Note that NEO is the last resort and the Ambassador / Chief of Mission retains responsibility for all these phases except when he has left the country and the embassy is closed and/or full scale combat operations are present i.e., wartime situation. In such cases, the military commander is responsible for noncombatant evacuation.
 - 6.1. **Travel advisories for nation's citizens.** Reduce / discourage additional nation's citizens from entering the host nation (embassy).
 - 6.1.1. NOTE: Travel advisories update the public (travelers and residents) of the current situation in the country. They provide information that assists the potential evacuees determination of whether to evacuate. These do not restrict additional citizens from entering the country.
 - 6.2. **Drawdown (embassy)**
 - 6.2.1. Authorized departure (voluntary)

6.2.2. Ordered departure (directed)

- i. When decision is made to go to an authorized or ordered departure some nations will publish a Travel warning that advises visitors to reconsider entering the host nation. These orders only apply to personnel that fall under the authority of the Chief of Mission.

7. There are three types of evacuation operations.

7.1. #1 Embassy managed and executed evacuation operations, (no military assistance provided);

7.2. #2 Military assisted evacuation operation / NEO (Chief of Mission in host nation); and

7.3. #3 Military led evacuation operation / NEO (Chief of Mission has departed host nation and embassy closed)

8. Embassy managed and executed evacuation operations (no military assistance provided).

8.1. Stand fast (preparatory procedures for embassy evacuation)

8.2. Leave commercial transportation

9. Military assisted evacuation operation / NEO (Chief of Mission in host nation embassy responsible overall) - two sub-types.

9.1. Type A: Military assisted NEO (Chief of Mission in host nation): **Minor military support only** - logistics / transportation, etc. No major security requirements. Is referred to as “Service (Military) Assisted evacuation” in some nations.

9.2. Type B: Military assisted NEO (Chief of Mission in host nation): **Significant military support required.** Is referred to as “Service (Military) Protected evacuation” in some nations.

10. Military led evacuation operation / NEO (Chief of Mission has departed host nation and embassy closed, military responsible overall)

10.1. This form of NEO is normally conducted in serious threat situations where there is a hostile threat.

10.2. Some form of combat operations may be required in such situation and many small nations may request the assistance of larger nations with robust military forces and capabilities.

11. Nature of Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) - Awareness of the Strategic National / Foreign Affairs / State Department Perspectives. NEO differ greatly from other military operations because direction of the operation will usually remain with the Ambassador or Chief of Mission, if present, at the time of evacuation. Further, the order to evacuate is always a political decision, with extensive ramifications. It is CRITICAL that **Military planners must have the requirements and perspectives of the Ambassador / Chief of Mission fully integrated into all plans and orders.**

Military planners (operational and strategic) must coordinate closely with Foreign Affairs offices / embassy offices within the host nation and at the National governmental levels within their respective nations. The factors below are paramount when planning NEO operations:

11.1. **Security of Planning Actions.** NEO is a highly sensitive political and diplomatic decision. It may indicate to the host nation government, local population, international business community, international press, and other governments that the situation has deteriorated to the point that the nations involved have lost faith in the host nation's ability to maintain control of the situation or extensive danger to evacuees exists.

11.1.1. Diplomatic channels will be attempting to resolve the situation when NEO planning is occurring. NEO planning must not interfere with these diplomatic efforts. Uncoordinated statements, actions,

deployments, press comments, or planning actions could send an inappropriate or unintended message while diplomatic efforts are ongoing and escalate a crisis rather than prevent a crisis.

11.2. NEO can further destabilize a crisis situation. The simple announcement that an evacuation operation is being considered, planned, or is being ordered can escalate an already deteriorating situation. NEO planning and coordination can actually increase the threat to a nation's citizens if handled improperly (increase the likelihood of citizens becoming a target or hostages). The planning process must take this factor into account at all times.

11.3. Foreign Affairs / State Department Planning - Requires Awareness and Coordination. Military planners must be aware that the Foreign Affairs Office / embassy(ies) have evacuation plans and will most likely be executing some phase of this plan. Further, they will be actively updating such plans as the crisis evolves.

11.3.1. Military planners must be fully aware of this and work with Foreign Affairs / embassy planners to ensure all plans are coordinated, integrated, and approved by applicable embassy(ies) and the NEO TF commander.

11.3.2. In this regard, a Strategic Assessment Team and NEO TF Forward Liaison Element (FLE) should deploy at the earliest dates to the respective embassy or chief of mission headquarters when a NEO is being contemplated.

11.3.3. Further, joint and integrated briefings should be presented to the JTF / CTF commander and the Ambassador / Chief of Mission at the same time to have clear unity of effort between military and Foreign Affairs channels.

12. Three Key Operational Decisions. The decisions below should be addressed in the early planning stages for a NEO mission. Focusing on these decisions will provide good starting points for NEO planning and execution. They are the foundations for unity of effort and effective mission accomplishment by a NEO TF.

12.1. Decision #1 -- What is the NEO Threat Environment and Evacuation Situation?

12.1.1. What is the NEO threat environment that is present within the host nation? What is the potential for escalation of the threat to evacuees? What are the numbers and demographics of personnel requiring evacuation (and other nations involved in NEO ops)? Where are they located in the host nation? Are there NGOs in the AO with evacuation requirements and/or resources that can assist evacuation?

12.1.2. Consider inviting NGO representatives to coordination meetings. What assumptions are being made in regard to the threat and evacuee situation? Are the assumptions coordinated with key planning agencies (State or Foreign Affairs Office, Strategic planners, and supporting agencies)? What will happen if one or more of the planning assumptions prove to be wrong? What level of military support is requested by the Ambassadors / Chiefs of Mission and how is this effectively coordinated and executed?

12.2. Decision #2 - What is the Conceptual Framework for the NEO Mission? What are the broad operational phases for the NEO mission (campaign plan phases or OPLAN / OPORD phases)? What are the critical events within a NEO mission (framework for planning)? Who is responsible for each event and function (military and/or Foreign Affairs/State Department office)?

12.3. Decision # 3 - How does the NEO TF Commander ensure plans are fully coordinated and integrated with Foreign Affairs, State Departments, multinational, and coalition military channels? How does the NEO TF commander ensure Operations Plans (OPLANs) and Operation Orders (OPORDs) are thoroughly planned and integrated with the existing plans by Foreign Affairs / State Department agencies? How are multinational and coalition operations coordinated? How is multinational and coalition cooperation conducted? How are JTF operations (single nation NEO execution) coordinated with ongoing multinational and coalition operations? What NEO TF planning mechanisms ensure NEO planning fully integrates coalition forces and support when required?

Decision #1 – What is the NEO Threat Environment and Evacuation Situation?

NEO Threat Environment and Evacuee Situation. The NEO TF tasked with conducting a NEO tailors its planning and action for evacuation assistance according to the threat environment, friendly situation, and evacuee situation. The requirement for NEO may exist due to an unfavorable political environment, conflict, or natural disaster in the host nation.

1. **Threat Environment:** The three threat environments the military may face in NEO are:

1.1. **Permissive Environment:** The host nation military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist a NEO.

1.1.1. **Conditions:** There is no apparent physical threat to evacuees. The host nation will not oppose their orderly departure or joint / multinational military assistance. Military assistance is normally limited to medical, logistics, military police (MP) or other security, and transportation. Security forces are tailored to what is required to protect military property and personnel.

1.1.2. **Contingency Plans:** Depending on the political situation in the host nation, the NEO TF commander may elect to have a reaction force on standby to respond rapidly if the environment becomes less permissive. Plans for movement to an uncertain environment should also be prepared with the appropriate triggering conditions. Weapons may or may not accompany NEO forces. However, if any threat or instability is possible, units should deploy with weapons and basic loads of ammunition; alternately, stage them in a nearby Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) / Forward Mounting Base (FMB) for immediate deployment as required by the situation.

1.1.3. **Military assistance may be required because of a natural or man-made disaster or because of inadequate transportation facilities.** Military support could then involve engineer units or contractors. Local law enforcement agencies may request MP or other military forces to assist in maintaining and restoring order.

1.2. **Uncertain Threat:** The host nation forces, whether opposed to or receptive to a NEO, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended AO.

1.2.1. **Conditions:** The degree of danger is uncertain. The host nation may or may not be in control but cannot ensure the safety of evacuees.

1.2.2. **Contingency Plans:** Because of the uncertainty, the NEO TF commander may elect to reinforce the evacuation force with additional security units and tactical PSYOPs units. Contingency plans will be more important in this circumstance, as will the need for a reaction force. Should the situation deteriorate, opposed entry operations (forced entry ops) may be required. In this environment, the TF commander will issue weapons and ammunition to evacuation force personnel.

i. The ROE must be disseminated early enough to ensure troops are trained and must be strictly enforced to avoid escalation of hostilities.

ii. NEO TF commander has to clearly indicate to all parties that he is authorized to use force and will do so if it is required for him to accomplish his mission. This will decrease the likelihood of interference and inadvertent escalation of hostilities due to misunderstanding.

1.3. **Hostile Threat:** Hostile forces have the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the NEO.

1.3.1. **Conditions:** Host nation or other forces are expected to oppose evacuation operation. The NEO TF commander may elect to deploy a sizable security element with the evacuation force. He may position a large reaction force either with the evacuation force or at an ISB / FMB. Opposed entry operations (forced entry operations) may be required. The ROE must be strictly enforced.

Contingency ROE may be critical in case of escalation of hostilities or the increased threat of harm to evacuees or NEO TF personnel. The approval levels for contingency ROE must be clearly known.

1.3.2. Contingency Plans: Forced entry contingency plans must be present.

- i. Forced entry operations may be required for entering the host nation or for entering parts of the country for executing evacuation operations. Supporting plans for positioning of forces and logistics support must be detailed and viable. Reaction or reinforcement forces must be on a high alert for deployment and employment.
- ii. Tiered execution for reaction or reinforcement forces is possible; i.e., if the potential requirement for the reaction force is triggered by conditions in the host nation, the force can move to an in-country secure location and maintain a low visibility posture. If the conditions for employment are triggered, the reaction force can then be rapidly deployed.

1.4. **Evacuee Situation:** The parameters of the evacuee situation must be clearly established for identification of the scope of the NEO mission and resources required. The number, classification, nationalities and location of evacuees will determine the complexity of the NEO. Further, the infrastructure support required for support of the NEO mission needs to be identified early on. The Ambassador, Chief of Mission, and Foreign Affairs office normally coordinates the host nation support for evacuation operations. Listed below are the major factors that will define the evacuee situation:

1.4.1. Number of evacuees (national and multinational) and demographics (men, women, pregnant women, children, elderly, babies, persons requiring special care, etc.).

1.4.2. Determination of priorities and designations per national policies.

- i. Multinational evacuees require formal diplomatic nation-to-nation agreement on such evacuation support.

1.4.3. Locations of evacuees and assembly areas. Security requirements for movement to assembly areas and evacuation points (departure airfields (APOE – Aerial Port Of Embarkation) or seaports (SPOE – Sea Port Of Embarkation)).

1.4.4. Host nation support infrastructure for support and movement of evacuees.

1.4.5. Number of potential friendly nation evacuees.

- i. This is key contingency planning data. In one NEO operation, the estimate of evacuees (national and multinational) was 215 (two nations involved, one nation evacuating all of these personnel based upon nation-to-nation agreements). During the actual NEO operation, 10 other nations requested support to the Ambassador, and the Ambassador approved their requests in a real-time fashion resulting in 2500 total evacuees over a two-week operation (originally a 2 day operation).

1.4.6. Pet evacuee requirements and policies.

1.4.7. Special medical, logistical, or communication requirements based upon evacuee situation.

1.4.8. Local embassy / Chief of Mission plans for notification, recall, alert, and assembly actions (Warden/Recall system).

1.4.9. Local embassy / Chief of Mission NEO assembly plans and host nation support plans.

1.4.10. Special food requirements relating to allergies, religion, etc.

NOTE: The above list is neither prioritized nor exhaustive. Each situation must be evaluated on its own merits.

2. Assumption Testing - Contingency Plans

- 2.1. Assumption Testing: Closely review and coordinate the threat environment and the evacuee situation assumptions with the Ambassador / Chief of Mission's staff and with the higher and supporting military headquarters. Assumptions in question, or which could change, require contingency plans. After the initial plans or orders are completed, a continual review of the assumptions is also critical to ensure an evolving situation does not invalidate key assumptions and put the NEO mission accomplishment in jeopardy. Well thought out contingency plans with execution triggers (conditions for execution) can greatly assist this process.
- 2.2. Examples: Listed below are a few examples of assumptions for a NEO mission and the resulting actions that came out of a close review of the assumptions. These are only examples. Each situation will have a distinct set of assumptions that are specific to a given situation or mission.

Assumption #1: An Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) will be available within the host nation.

If this is false, then a forced entry operation to seize an airfield may be required or evacuation will have to be via land or by sea. Contingency plans for these operations must be prepared.

Assumption #2: All evacuees will be alerted and assembled as planned.

If this is false the time line will be extended; operations to secure and bring noncombatants to the APOE or SPOE may be required. Contingency plans to secure assembly areas and movement of evacuees to the APOE or SPOE are required.

Assumption #3: Military aircraft will be available for movement within 48 hours.

If this is false it will invalidate the evacuation time line. Therefore, based upon the threat and evacuee situation, contingency plans for securing and supporting evacuees for extended support periods may be required and effect the composition of forces (i.e., some limited support and logistics may accompany the NEO TF even for estimated short evacuations ops situations).

Decision #2 - What is the Planning Framework for the NEO Mission?

Planning Framework - NEO Operational Phases and Conceptual Framework and. It is essential that joint, multinational, and coalition NEO planning be based upon a common framework.. This is best addressed by outlining a common base line for the operational phases of the mission and agreement of conceptual framework of the major actions and events within the operational phases.

A common phasing and conceptual framework are not meant to restrict NEO planning; rather, they are intended to provide a start point for a common frame of reference, common terminology, and an outline of common sequential (and parallel) events for a NEO mission. In some cases, this framework will use multiple terminologies for a common event to capture the variations among nations (with a focus on the function for the event).

1. **NEO Operational Phases:** Operational level planning is the link between tactical and strategic objectives and is the arrangement of forces in time, space, and purpose for synchronization and integration at the JTF / CTF, interagency, and multinational force level. The operational phasing for NEO missions is one of the key tasks for NEO TF planning.

Figure D-1-A.2 and D-1-A.3 are the initial templates for the NEO OPLAN / OPORD (Campaign Plan) phases. They are primarily dependant upon the threat environment present. These broad templates are only provided as a start point and are not intended to restrict flexibility in the naming and numbering of phases for NEO. This is situational dependant and the prerogative of the NEO TF Commander.

Phase 1: Predeployment - Alert - Activation (Preparatory)

Phase 2: Deployment - Initial Control Operations (Preliminary)

Phase 3: Evacuation Operations

Phase 4: Intermediate and Final Safe Haven Operations (if required)**

Phase 5: Withdrawal - Redeployment

** Can be part of Phase 3 as a subphase.

Figure D-1-A.2: Operational NEO Phases for Permissive NEO Operational Environments

The following phase terminology is functionally oriented. Further, it attempts to integrate various nations' terminology into one descriptive set for each NEO phase. Again the number of phases and terminology are flexible; the above serves only as a starting point for planning by the NEO TF.

- Phase 1: Predeployment - Alert - Activation (Preparatory)
- Phase 2: Deployment - Entry - Security Established (Preliminary)
 - Phase 2A: Deploy and establish ISB / FMB
 - Phase 2B: Entry Operations (Unopposed or Forced Entry Operations).
 - Phase 2C: Secure Evacuees
- Phase 3: Evacuation Operations
- Phase 4: Safe Haven Operations (if required)**
- Phase 5: Withdrawal - Redeployment

** Can be part of Phase 3 as a sub-phase.

Figure D-1-A.3: Operational NEO Phases for Uncertain & Hostile NEO Operational Environments:

2. **NEO Conceptual Framework:** The framework for NEO CONOPS with the critical events for each phase is outlined below and visually depicted in Figure D-1-A.4 and D-1-A.5. Phase 5 “Withdrawal and Redeployment” is not visually depicted since this is a standard phase common to all military operations. These concepts have repeatedly been validated historically by many nations and are accepted by most nations.

2.1. **Phase 1 -- Predeployment (Preparatory):** Situation deteriorates, strategic assessment team deploys to embassy, command and control identified, Warning Order issued, NEO TF activated, NEO Forward Liaison Element (FLE) deploys to embassy, NEO TF Liaison and Planning Teams deploy to appropriate HQs, and NEO TF Coalition Coordination Centre established. Execute Order issued.

2.2. **Phase 2 -- Deployment (Preliminary):** NEO TF marshals, deploys, secures ISB/FMB and FOB if required, secures evacuees, gains control of the situation. Secures evacuation sites as required (Assembly Area (AA), Evacuation Control Centre (ECC), and critical nodes as required by threat situation).

2.3. **Phase 3 -- Evacuation Operations.**


2.3.1. Reception Centres & assembly areas: Alert, Assemble, Initial Processing, and Security


2.3.2. Marshalling and movement to evacuation point: Military assisted if required by threat.

2.3.3. Evacuation Control Centre: Receive, process, and prepare for movement – depart

2.4. **Phase 4 -- Safe Haven Operations.** Intermediate location (ISB / FMB) out of host nation for rapid turn around of aircraft sorties and securing evacuees in safe area. Follow-on movement into safe havens.

2.5. **Phase 5 -- Withdrawal - Redeployment.** Closing of embassy; withdrawal operation (possibly combat withdrawal).





NOTES:

- (1) Deployment of NEO Coalition Coordination Teams is critical for fully coordinated multinational evacuation operations. These teams (Foreign Affairs / Military) represent their various nations at the critical nodes within the evacuation process.
- (2) During planning and coordination with the embassy / Foreign Affairs office, clearly establish who is responsible for actions within the evacuation process. The NEO TF provides security and support to the embassy / Foreign Affairs office that runs the registration and processing of evacuees. However, in emergency situations the military may be required to perform the majority of tasks in-country (with embassy assistance) due to the threat situation. Further, the military will normally secure and run the ISB / FMB out of country (which can be the intermediate Safe Haven).

Decision #3 - How does the NEO TF Commander ensure plans are fully coordinated and integrated with Foreign Affairs, State Department, Multinational, and Coalition military channels?

1. Ensuring Plans are Fully Coordinated and Integrated.

- 1.1. With the increased interdependence of nations within the 21st Century and the increased ability to share, collaborate, and cooperate via secure informational systems, it is prudent to take steps to provide for enhanced multinational NEO planning coordination and cooperation.
- 1.2. Further, the military planning and Foreign Affairs / State Department planning should be fully coordinated and integrated within national strategic, theater strategic, and operational levels. This is imperative for effective mission accomplishment and unity of effort.
- 1.3. The concepts below are options for enhanced coordination and cooperation and can be tailored or adjusted based upon the security concerns and sensitivities present. They are fully scaleable.

2. Multinational Coordination Centre(s) (MNCC) and Coalition Coordination Teams. The MNCC concept is the foundation for all coalition planning and coordination; it is essential for effective NEO mission execution. These centres are key organizational concepts for effective coordination and integration of joint / coalition planning actions.

- 2.1. **MNCC.** [Refer to Part B, Chapter 2: Multinational Coordination Center](#) for details.
- 2.2. **Coalition Coordination Teams.** Respective nations cooperating or participating within a given JTF / CTF Area of Operations (AO) deploy Coalition Coordination Teams to the established MNCCs. The Coalition Coordination Team differs from Liaison Officers in that they have a full planning responsibility within their structure (the degree and depth of which is dependent upon the planning requirements).
- 2.3. **Coalition Coordination Teams Deployment to Critical Evacuation Nodes:** Each nation participating within a multinational NEO should deploy Coalition Coordination Team(s) made up of Foreign Affairs / State Department personnel (and military personnel) positioned at the three critical nodes within the evacuation framework. Following are the critical evacuation nodes for the Coalition Coordination Teams:
 - 2.3.1. **Team #1: Assembly Areas.** May require multiple teams if substantial number of evacuees is expected or if multiple assembly areas are required.
 - 2.3.2. **Team #2: Evacuation Control Centre (ECC):** A **critical team** for final processing and manifesting prior to departure from the host nation. Again multiple teams may be required if there are multiple ECCs.
 - 2.3.3. **Team #3: Intermediate Safe Haven:** Another critical team for the processing of an nations' evacuees upon arrival is located at this site. Normally, when there are multiple nations involved in a NEO evacuation, the Intermediate Safe Haven (or Temporary Safe Haven) serves as the location where the evacuees are separated by nation and processed for movement back to designated home countries or other destinations as directed and coordinated by their respective nations. Final processing for movement and security checks are also made at the Intermediate safe haven.

3. Special Assessment and Planning Liaison Teams. These teams are essential to ensure thorough coordination and planning is accomplished with Foreign Affairs / State Department (Ambassador / Chief of Mission), higher headquarters, supporting agencies and other coalition nations participating within the NEO mission.

- 3.1. **Strategic Military Assessment Team (SAT).** Deploys prior to the activation of a JTF or CTF at the onset of a crisis and is deployed by the Supported Strategic Commander to the embassy HQs within the host nation (refer to Figure D-1-A.4). The SAT deploys early in a crisis to the embassy upon approval by the Ambassador/Chief of Mission. This team deploys to the host nation to assess the situation for the Supported Strategic Commander. This team establishes redundant communications links with the embassy, and assists in identifying the broad NEO mission requirements. They also provides valuable in-country situational awareness (reconnaissance capability) for the Supported Strategic Commander.

- 3.2. **Forward Liaison Element / Forward Command Element (FLE / FCE):** This is the JTF / CTF forward planning, liaison, and command element that deploys upon activation of a JTF / CTF command, with the approval of the Ambassador/Chief of Mission and upon issuance of a warning order for possible NEO mission execution.
- 3.2.1. The term FLE and FCE are interchangeable, but the use of FLE may be more acceptable within diplomatic channels during crises action periods (the term command can have unintended consequences when received by host nation governmental agencies, local or international press media, and NGOs / IOs).
- 3.2.2. It conducts detailed planning and coordination with the Ambassador/Chief of Mission staff for the NEO TF Commander. It is the means by which military and foreign affairs / state department planning is fully integrated. Further, this team ensures the JTF / CTF commander fully understands the Ambassador / Chief of Mission's perspectives and requirements.
- 3.2.3. The FLE has the ability to split its personnel so planners can remain at the embassy while the remainder of the FLE can act as the advance element for the NEO TF's deployment at the arrival airfield or forward operating base (FOB).
- 3.2.4. This element can deploy in echelon with a small planning party initially deploying followed by a more robust element as the planning matures and JTF / CTF advance party personnel are required in-country for preparation of the main NEO TF deployment. Ongoing operational and logistical planning, continuous reconnaissance capability, robust and redundant communications, and confirmation of on-the-ground coordination (intelligence and situational awareness) are key features of this element for effective NEO mission effectiveness.
- 3.3. **NEO TF Liaison Teams and Planning Teams.** These teams ensure liaison and detailed planning are present with higher headquarters, supporting agencies, and other key nodes essential for effective NEO mission execution.
- 3.3.1. **Higher Headquarters.** JTF / CTF Liaison and Planning Teams should be immediately deployed to the supported strategic commander's headquarters for liaison throughout the NEO mission. The Liaison Team's Officer in Charge is the direct representative with the NEO TF's higher headquarters.
- 3.3.2. **Key Supporting Agencies.** JTF / CTF Liaison and Planning Teams should be deployed (exchanged) based upon the situational requirements for key supporting agencies. The key point of these teams is to ensure thorough and complete coordination is achieved for critical support and operational execution actions.

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